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Klaus Krippendorff
On the Essential Contexts of Artifacts
or on the Proposition that
"Design Is Making Sense (of Things)" 1

t) Part of this work was supported by the
design firm RichardsonSmith, Worth
ington, Ohio, and Ohio State University,
Columbus, while on sabbatical leave in
1986-87 from the University of Pennsyl
vania, Philadelphia.

Introduction
The etymology of design goes back to the Latin de + signare and
means making something, distinguishing it by a sign, giving it
significance, designating its relation to other things, owners,
users, or gods. Based on this original meaning, one could say:
design is making sense (of things).
Design is making sense (of things)
The phrase is conveniently ambiguous. It could be read as "design
is a sense creating activity" that can claim perception, experience,
an<l1, perhaps, esthetics as its fundamental concern and this idea is
quite intentional. Or it can be regarded as meaning that "the
products of design are to be understandable or meaningful to
someone" and that this interpretation is even more desirable. The
phrase of things is in parentheses to cast doubt on a third
interpretation that "design is concerned with the subjective
meanings of 'objectively existing' objects." The parentheses
suggest that we cannot talk about things that make no sense at all,
that the recognition of something as a thing is already a sense
derived distinction, and that the division of the world into a
subjective and an objective realm is therefore quite untenable.
However, making sense always entails a bit of a paradox between
the aim of making something new and different from what was
there before, and the desire to have it make sense, to be
recognizable and understandable. The former calls for innovation,
while the latter calls for the reproduction of historical continuities.
In the past, sense was provided by alchemy, mythology, and
theology. Now we speak less globally of a symbolic.ordering that is
constitutive of cognition, culture, and reality. Somehow, the word
design has not remained in this creative state of paradox, but has
shifted to one side. Its current meaning amplifies the aspect of
making or, more specifically, of applying a technical-functional
rationality to the material world at the expense of the sense that
was to be achieved thereby. Perhaps, the pendulum has swung too
far. Perhaps, technology has moved too fast for culture to keep up
with it. Whatever the explanation, the current concern with
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product semantics is nothing other than a reaction to the missing
sense modern industrial products make or a deliberate effort to
recapture this lost territory for design,

2) Klaus Krippendorff and Reinhart Butter,
"Product Semantics: Exploring the
Symbolic Qualities of Form,'' /nnovation
3, 2 (1984): 4-9.
3) The idea of autopoiesis, the process of
self-production, has its origin in biology
and was introduced in Humberto R.
Maturana and Fra ncisco G. Varela,
Autopoiesis and Cognition, Boston Stu
dies in Philosophy of Science (Boston:
Reidel, 1980). It is consid ered as a
defining process of living systems and is
contrasted there with allopoiesis, the
process of producing something mater
ially different from what produced it,
including reproduction, The original
authors are somewhat hesitant to apply
the notion of autopoiesis to social
systems. However, a culture as a whole
certainly produces itself continuously
and in the same physical space. The role
of machines in cultural autopoicsis is
explored in Dorion Sagan and Lynn
Margulis, "Gaia and the Evolution of
Machines," Whole Earth Review 55
(Summer 1987): 15-21. Alain Touraine's
The Self-Production ofSociety (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977) as
sumes a sociological perspective of auto
p01es1s,
4) See Robert I. Blaich's experiences with
product semantics at Philips Corporate
Design, presented to the National Con
ference of the Industrial Designers Soci
ety of America on "Forms of Design,"
(Evanston: Northwestern University,
August 7-10, 1986). A similar report is
included in this issue.
5) Krippendorff and Butter, "Product Se
mantics," cited above, and Klaus Krip
pendorff, Uberr den Zeichen- und Sym
bolcharacter von Gegensti!mden: Versuch
zu einer Zeichentheorie /lir die Program
mierung von Productformen in Sozialen
Konimunikationsstrukturen, Diplom
Thesis (Ulm: Hochschule fur Gestal
tung, 1961).

6) Charles Sanders Pierce, Collected Papers
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1931-1953), 228.
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Product semantics
Elsewhere, we introduced product semantics as a study of the
symbolic qualities of man-made forms in the cognitive and social
contexts of their use and the application of the knowledge gained to
objects ofindustrial design. 2 By this definition, product semantics is
not a style, program, or movement. Rather, it is a concern for the
sense artifacts make to users, for how technical objects are
symbolically embedded in the fabric of society, and what
contributions they thereby make to the autopoiesis of culture. 3
The definition recognizes formally what in the past good designers
may have done intuitively but without a conceptual and linguistic
repertoire to talk about it. Designers who are aware of product
semantics may work quite differently from those who are not.
They articulate different aims and criteria and tackle different
design problems. The illustrations provided in this issue by
practitioners speak for themselves.
Product semantics should not be confused with ergonomics,
which is almost entirely committed to the afore-mentioned
t&hnical rationality of optimizing systems performance. The
experiential fact that people voluntarily accept considerable
inconveniences to drive the car of their dreams, live with furniture
they like, or wear clothes for which they are admired, suggests that
other than technical criteria dominate everyday life and individual
well-being.
Product semantics is also far from being a mere marketing tool.
Although it has contributed to economic success, 4 the celebration
of wholeness, the concern with how material artifacts connect
people to each other, the respect for mythology and archetypes
that are rooted deep in the collective unconscious, and the interest
in an ecology of symbols and mind go beyond industry's immediate
concern with production and consumption.
Product semantics should not be tied to traditional semiotics
either. The symbolic qualities or the meanings objects may have to
different users easily escape traditional semiotic conceptions 5
insofar as they locate meanings either in the objective referents of
signs (naive referential theory), in the imputed relation between
signs and what they are intended to stand for or represent
(referential theory proper), or in the somewhat more objectively
describable form, nature, or features of sign vehicles (physicalistic
theory). Such conceptions have been made explicit in the
indissoluble triad of semiotics. The version in figure 1 is taken
from Charles Sanders Pierce, who defined a sign as "something
which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
capacity."'

USER

SIGN - STAND-7oRRu°A�m7s;;';- REFERENT

Fig, !)

Although these referential notions must be overcome here, to
be fair, traditional semiotic approaches are not entirely without
merit for industrial design. However, I see only two valid
applications. The first sheds light on the use of linguistic
expressions (for example, printed user's instructions and labels)
and nonlinguistic graphic/acoustic/olfactory signs (whether as
symbols, icons, or indexes), all of which stand for something other
than themselves (for example, for contents, internal states,
options of functions, and movements available). The second
concerns itself with how information from outside an artifact is
processed and perceptively exhibited (for example, through TV
monitors, loud speakers, information displays, and scales of
measurement) to users who interpret what they see as covarying
with distant or otherwise unnoticeable events. Neither of these
applications of semiotics is my primary concern nor do I believe
these to be central to industrial design.
A suitable starting point for product semantics is the experien
tial fact that people surround themselves with objects that make
sense to them, they can identify as to what they are, when, how, for
what, and in which context they may be used. Such objects can
hardly be viewed as substitutes for something else, as traditional
sem.iotics may have it, but they do reveal, communicate, or present
themselves in the experiences of people. This is true for the whole
spectrum of everyday things, from industrially produced consumer'
products to highly individualized works of art. To be of use to
someone, things must be capable of this kind of presentation.
The self-reference this presentation implies does not fit into the
semiotic triad, however. And for semiotics to exorcise self
reference from analysis because of its lack of fit and thus to impose
other-referential notions, instead, encourages both a way of
interpreting the world and a particular design practice. The latter
particularly encourages products that either appear different from
what they are (are made in the image of something else, hide their
operation behind unrelated facades, deceive users with fake
symbolisms) or are covered with linguistic instructions and
graphics. I am convinced that this kind of semiotization of
material culture alienates people from participation in the real
world and has always been a mark of bad styling. Although
product semantics is not committed to any style, good or bad, we
should not simply dismiss semiotic ideas for their limitations, but
rather avoid semiotics' epistemological traps.

Sense-making
When presenting everyday artifacts, such as furniture items,
vehicles, tools, office equipment, and so forth, to ordinary people
and asking them what they see, the range of responses is
extraordinary. Very few responses occur in semiotic categories of
Design Issues: Vol. V, Number 2
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what the object resembles, represents, signifies, points to, and is about.
Most are concerned with what the object is, indicated by its name;
what it is made for, what it does; how its parts are connected and
work together; who typically uses it and in which situations; what
others would say about it or about its use; what it is made of and by
what processes; who designed it, who made it, who sold it; how its
operational principles differ from the usual; relative size, appearance,
workmanship, durability, price, how it effects the environment; and
how efficient its use is; and so forth.
When respondents are more familiar with objects or are
presented with very personal items, additionally they relate to
these in the following additional terms: who gave it to them; how it

was acquired; of whom it reminds them; in which circumstances it
figured prominently; how much care, service, repair, or even
affection it consumed; how well it fits with other possessions; how
enjoyable its presence is; how it feels; and how close it is to the user's
definition of him/herself.
7) Ukich Neism, Cognition and Reality

(San Frnncisco: Freeman, 1976)·

The list reflects what Ulrich Neisser7 observed after many
experiments of this sort: people do not perceive pure forms,
unrelated objects, or things as such but as meanings. The
distinction between what an object is and what that object means
to s�mebody may not be demonstrable as far as perceptual data are
concerned,
The above answers suggest that objects are always seen in a
context (of other things, situations, and users, including the
observing self). Responding by saying what something is for puts
that something into the context of an intended use. Responding
by anticipating what others would think about its user puts that
object into a social context that includes other people. Even
naming what is seen puts the named in the context of language use.

The context into which people place the object they see is cognitively
constructed, whether recognized, anticipated, or wholly imaginary.

Seeing something in a store as a chair requires imagining its use at
home or in an office, a context that may or may not be realized in
practice. Estimating its durability requires constructing from past
experiences contexts of misuse or extreme stress.

Meaning is a cognitively constructed relationship. It selectively
connects features of an object and features of its (real environment or
imagined) context into a coherent unity. The reasons for such

relationships are numerous. Engineers and ergonomists have
almost exclusively settled on functions, measurable, causal
connections that are manifest in the push and pull of controlled
physical forces. Although functional accounts (including semio
tically informed "stand-for" relationships) are undoubtedly
meaningful to some, ordinary people also employ many noncausal
relationships, such as similarities, contrasts, family belongingness,
associations, synchronicities, harmonies, or social conventions, to
12

relate objects to their environments. The perception of how
something fits into a cognitively constructed context has no
causal base, however.
What something is (the totality of what it means) to someone
corresponds to the sum total of its imaginable contexts. A knife has
all kinds of uses; cutting is merely the most prominent one. Prying
open a box, tightening a screw, scraping paint from a surface,
cleaning dirty fingernails are as imaginable as picking a pickle from
a pickle jar. In the context of manufacturing, a knife is a cost. In
the context of sales, a knife has an exchange value. In the context
of a hold-up, a knife may constitute a significant threat. All
possible contexts define what a knife is to people capable of using
their imagination.
I am furthermore suggesting the following: Making sense is a

circular cognitive process that may start with some initially
incomprehensible sensation, which then proceeds to imagining
hypothetical contexts for it and goes around a hermeneutic circle
during which features are distinguished - in both contexts and what
is to b·e made sense of - and meanings are constructed until this
process has converged to a sufficiently coherent understanding.
Explorations of something new and the "aha" experiences of
hai;ing understood the idea respectively exemplifies the circular
process of sense-making and its product. In perception, such
processes may take little time, but the fact that the same stimulus
may give rise to different responses in different situations by
different people demonstrates the importance of individual
cognitive contributions over those present in the "objective
stimulus." A user's sense-making process is graphically depicted in
figure 2.
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":'tlr�. Schwartz wants your meat loal recipe,
She needs to plaster her cellln1,"

Fig. 3)

The Harris Comic of figure 3 illustrates on two levels what the
somewhat abstract figure 2 is intended to show. The left frame
ignores the fine lines and shows a configuration that affords not
much more than that it is distinct from its context. The center
frame makes more sense: two people are facing each other, but this
isn't funny. The addition of the quotation is what enables the
reader to integrate all the components into a meaningful whole.
Moreover, the comic is based on changing the expected context of
a recipe, that is, cooking, to that of home improvement, in which
what the recipe informs receives a totally unexpected meaning.

Forln and meaning contextualized

8) In this issue, Helga and Hans-Ji.irgcn
Lannoch make the point that geometry
cannot account for an individual user's
point of view and, thus, is incapable of
describing the meanings that spatial
forms may acquire in human communi
cation. Their proposal is to construct,
instead, a different notion of space
associated with natural language, called a
semantic space, which explicitly includes
human perceptions and attributions of
meanings,

14

What is true for ordinary people ought to be true for professional
designers as well, for both are equipped with the same cognitive
apparatus. I am therefore suggesting that the forms designers
create - in German, industrial designers are called "form-givers"
- result from nothing other than a professional, as opposed to
ordinary, sense-making. Form and meaning are intricately related,
however, and their relationship is a fundamental concern of
product semantics. Something must have form to be seen but
must make sense to be understood and used. Form entails a
description (of something), without reference to an observer or
user (for example, see geometry, 8 physics, and objectivist esthetics,
which need no reference to the person applying them). In contrast,
meaning always requires reference to someone's (self or other)
cognitive processes. Accordingly, the designer's "form" is the
designer's way of objectifying and, hence, disowning their own
meaning in the process of making sense for others. How this
relationship comes about is depicted in figure 4.

INFORMS

PRODUCT SEMANTICS
MAKES SENSE

DESIGNER 11-4----FORM

Fig. 4)

MEANING

USER

----:,c�R-=-EA""'T:-::Es-""'
---1► ARTIFACT---- -cr_s_o__..,
A
N

9) See Gilbert H. Harman, "Three Levels
of Meanings," in Danny D. Steinberg
and Leon A. Jacobowitz, Semantics
(London: Cambridge University Press,
1971), 60-75.

When one thinks of measurable performance characteristics,
function has the same objective status as form. The slogan "form
follows function" thus implies abstracting the ordinary (scientif
icaHy naive, nonengineering-trained) user out of the equation and
discarding the meanings that users construct and see. The
increasingly appealing suggestion that form may not follow
function but meaning, brings the user back into the picture and
strongly suggests that designers need to discuss not only the
contexts in which their forms are used, but also how these forms
are made sense of or what they mean to someone other than
themselves. No one can presume that form (the designer's
objectified meaning) and (the user's) meaning are the same; hence,
the need for product semantics to study how they relate. The
consequent prescription, adopted by semantically informed
designers "form follows meaning," is intended to reflect on this
relationship which essentially is a relationship between designer's
and user's or client's cognition. Such a prescription is an empty
slogan, however, unless it is clear how a man-made form (artifact)
is conceived and how its meanings can be understood.
The circular process of constructing meaningful relations
between objects and contexts and the somewhat pragmatical
distinction between form and meaning suggest that overlapping
principles are operating here. Developing a single theory of
meaning applicable to all design situations may not be possible
though. Just as in linguistics, where several longstanding contro
versies concerning conceptions of meaning have been resolved by
pursuing in parallel several incompatible theories of meaning, 9 it
seems plausible that product semantics may also have to settle on
several parallel theories.
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Th� follo wing text outlines four essentially different contexts
.
_
m which obJects may mean in different ways. These four contexts
should provide fertile concepts from which powerful theories of
meaning for industrial designers may grow:
■ operational context, in which people are seen as interacting with
artifacts in use
sociolinguistic context, in which people are seen as communi
cating with each other about particular artifacts, their uses and
users, and thereby co-constructing realities of which objects
become constitutive parts
■ context of genesis, in which designers, producers, distributors,
users, and others are seen as participating in creating and
consuming artifacts and as differentially contributing to the
technical organization of culture and material entropy
■ ecological context, in which populations of artifacts are seen as
interacting with one another and contributing to the auto
poiesis (self-production) of technology and culture

■

10) Klaus Krippcndorff, "An Epistemolo
gical Foundation for Communication,"
Journal of Communication 34, 3 (1984):
21-36.

11) Hans-Jiirgen Lannoch, "How to Move
from Geometric to Semantic Space,"
Innovations 3, 2 (1984): 20-22. Helga
Lannoch and Hans-Ji..irgen Lannoch,
''Varn gcometrischcn zum semantischen
R,aum," Form 118 (1987): 12-17.
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Operational Context
Operational experiences with things are most common in everyday
life. Artifacts - from cups to cars and furniture to complex
computer systems - are handled all. the time. Unfortunately,
people and organizations are often included in this category of
objects as well. Although designers are intent to create forms that
are self-evident - that is, immediately identifiable for what they
are, obviously clear as to how they can be manipulated, and motivate
the user to interact with them - practice suggests that artifacts
often end up meaning something quite different from what was
intended. A designer may conceive a car as a means for transpor
tation but provide, instead, the material basis of social status
changes, commitments to a factory tradition, affectionate gifts
among friends, and something to do on weekends for someone
else. Within limits, any designed form may mean different things,
and they can become wholly different objects for different users.
An operational theory of meaning should explain how forms
constrain the sense users make of things in their environment. There
usually is give and take in sense-making processes. Distinctions are
drawn, relationships are hypothesized, and both are confirmed or
selectively dismissed after acting on their consequences . 10
Meanings are therefore not entirely invariant either; they are
acquired and learned, they change with use, expanding or con
tracting, all depending on the inventiveness of the user, the
affordances seen in a form, and the linguistic, cultural context in
which this sense-making takes place.
Despite the range of possible meanings designers consider, a
limited set of variables or semantic dimensions, as Lannoch and
Lannoch call them,11 describe most operational meanings of

objects - identities; qualities; orientations; locations; affordances;

states, dispositions, and logic; motivations; and redundancies.

The notion of a cognitive model, with which users approach,
explore, or interact with what designers consider a form is central
to all of these dimensions. With semantic considerations in mind,
designers may not start with the functions that a product is to
perform, but with the cognitive models that users have at their
disposal, can construct from available metaphors or metonyms or
easily acquire through practice. If there is any intentionality in
design, its forms should fit or be interpretable in terms of the
cognitive models that lead to their safe and socially desired use.

Identities

12) John R.heinfrank, personal communica
tion 1986, and in various informal presen
tations.
13) Jochen Gros, "Das zunehmendc Bcdiirf
nis nach Form," Form 107 (1984): 11-25.

Individuals typically approach the partitions in their environment
with identity questions in mind. They may ask themselves what
kind something is and which name applies. Thereafter, people may
have associations or expectations which come to play, representing
a set of behavioral "programs." The identity of a form usually
serves as a key or directive to a more detailed examination.
Identities may be defined by the following characteristics of an
object:
■ shape (whole appearance)
■ typical pattern or organization (the logic by which parts are
connected)
■ identifying features (which it has or does not have)
■ characteristic behavior (how it interacts with other things and
users)
Shapes, patterns of organization, features, and behaviors are
some of the vehicles through which designers can invoke the
perception of identities.
A distinction can also be drawn between identities that are
cognitively skeletal and present "deep structures," the "gist"12 or
"wesen" 1 3 of something as opposed to those that rely on
considerable detail, surface appearances, or elaborate meanings.

Qualities

14) Eleanor Rosch, "Principles of Categor
ization," in Eleanor Rosch and Barbara
B. Lloyd, eds. Cognition and Categor
ization (New York: Wiley, 1978): 27-48.

Recent research into categorization, particularly by Rosch, 14 has
shown that the classification of what something is or does relies
not so much on formal resemblances, or distinctions among sets of
objects as on cognitively constructed ideal types (unfortunately
also called prototypes). People assert qualitative differences to
these types. These qualities are often expressed by adjectival
constructions - fast cars, high-tech bicycles, black tulips, sleek
performances - and can therefore also be called attributes. The
attribution of qualities tends to create subordinate categories, and
their absence reveals the name of the ideal type of a category, often
expressible by simple nouns. Differences between a cpair and a
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15) Uday A, Athavankar, "Web of Images
Within,'' ARTHAYA, Proceedings of a
Conference on Visual Semantics (Bombay:
Indian Institute of Technology, Indus•
trial Design Center,January 20-22, 1987),
This paper also includes an excellent
overview of categorization (Rosch, Cog
nition and Categorization) from a design
perspective, A modified version is inclu
ded in this issue.

high chair, a book and a children's book, or a store and a grocery
store show the differences between basic categories and subor
dinate categories. Athavankar 15 lists several examples (modified
and extended here):

Subordinate
category

Source of the specific
attribute

baby shoes
sport shirt
evening dress
five-star hotel
Shaker furniture
baroque church
high-tech watch
steam engine
high-speed train
circular table

user
attitude
occasions
social class/price
region and craft
style
technology
source of energy
speed dimension
shape

Superficially, such attributes may seem to divide a genus into
the species of Aristotelian definitions, but, according to the
res�arch referred to above, they are more appropriately thought of
as indicating distances or differences between any member of a
category and its most central exemplar; the ideal, or prototype.
Below dimensions, characters, and features are distinguished and
the latter is subdivided into parts, properties, and configurations,
all of which may be used to explain the semantic differences in
qualities.
Dimensions are always present in a particular form and indicate
variable extents. Physical objects have volumes, masses, temper
atures, speeds, colors, textures, and shapes, for example. Chairs
are more or less comfortable to sit on, and the dimension of
comfort is an inalienable part of the definition of chair, just as a
ball has variable amounts of bounciness and a letter has variable
amounts of information. (Note that the dimension of amount of
information is not part of the conception of a ball and letters
cannot bounce.)
Features may or may not be present in a particular form and,
thus, do not enter the definition of its ideal type. Telephones may
or may not have a redial button and therefore differ in parts. The
canard-type airplane differs from a conventional airplane in its
configuration of- wings and rudders. Both are airplanes proper.
Gases and fluids, for example, differ in certain properties that can
be conceived of as different responses to particular actions
including the reflection of light, or whether they can be breathed,
placed into an open container, etc. Parts, configurations, and
properties are all optional to the definition of a form said to have
them.

18

16) See Reinhart Butter's contribution to
this issue.

Characters are symbolic analogues to features in that they
require semantic (dual) interpretations. For example, a column
may have the property of supporting a certain load but may appear
too fragile to be trusted for this purpose. Butter's truck interiors 16
have the characters of "high-tech," "low-tech," "contemporary,"
"functional," and "futuristic," respectively. Characters qualify
objects as adjectives qualify nouns.
Orientations
Users describe the forms of objects rarely in terms of three
dimensional geometry or by reference to the physical forces
holding them together, but in relation to their own body, vision,
or motion. Except perhaps for a perfect sphere, most objects have
"faces" that under normal conditions face their user. For example,
the screen and the important controls of a "television set are "in
front." The remainders are sides, top, bottom, or back. Rarely
does anyone confuse such obvious orientations. There also is an
inside and an outside. There are directional pointers in the shape
of a gun, for example. Movements are described toward or away
from a user. Underlying many orientations are metaphors of
interpersonal communication: the front of a person faces the front
of artother and so is the front of an object defined to face its user.
Other orientations are derived .from viewing something from a
distance, the preferred view being the one that provides the most
relevant information.

Locations

Objects may have not only orientations relative to a user but also
locations in a space constituted by other things. A picture may be
kept inside a box, lay on the floor, or hang on the wall, framed or
not. In right-side driving countries, the driver's seat is on the left
side of the car. A kitchen appliance may be either stored on a shelf
or sit on a working surface, perhaps together with required
containers and supplies. A bicycle wheel may be either detached or
mounted, and so forth. True, locations are sometimes expressible
in geometric terms, but the examples express locations in
reference to a semantical space and relative to other objects in a
user's environments.

Affordances

17) James J. Gibson, Reason for Realism,
edited by Edward Reed and Rebecca
Jones (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1982).
Gibson uses the term affordance in a
more objectivist or naive realist sense,
suggesting that objects possess these
capabilities for users to simply "pick up"
or see. As one cannot possibly list all
affordances of something without refer
ence to someone, I am instead suggesting

Affordances, a term taken from Gibson,1 7 denotes all possible
behaviors (form) that confirm what a user expects the object to do
(meaning). A chair should afford support of a user's weight. A
telephone should afford talking beyond the range of voice. Note
that chair and telephone and their affordances refer to cognitive
models or constructions that users identify as things of a
particular kind, not to what they"objectively" are. Whatever an
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to start out with that someone's cogni
tive models, including motivations and
situational determinants, according to
which expectations are formed and
affordances are seen.

artifact's form, if it is capable of performing according to a
particular user model, it can be said to afford it. If it frustrates such
a model, it does not. Forms may mislead a user regarding
affordances, suggest capabilities that are not there (errors of
commission), or hide what can be afforded (errors of omission).
Errors of omission are not so bad because inventing a new use for a
well-known product is always possible and concealing how
something could be handled from particular user groups may
sometimes be desirable, for example, making it difficult for
children to open a medicine bottle. However, our current
consumer-ori�nted society is especially prone to errors of
commission: promising something valuable that experiences do
not quite bear out. Examples range from sophisticated looking,
high-tech, electronic equipment, with many controls and indi
cators that are largely decorative, to plastic house plants with
variable fragrances.
Designing with affordances in mind starts not with a speci
fication of functions but with perceivable dimensions, characters,
and features that feed into the range of readily available cognitive
models, including linguistic metaphors and metonyms facilitating
their onsite construction. Self-evidence, the efficient and instan
taneous semantic indication of what something is, is an example of
the "correct" presentation of a product's affordances to its user.
In analyzing how affordances are expressed, the tendency is to
distinguish between manual inputs, the features that afford touch,
movement, manipulation, and programming; visual orientations,
the features enabling users to coordinate their actions with those
of the artifact; and responses in context, the experiential effects of
manipulations of the environment ultimately controlling users'
perceptions and either supporting or disconfirming the cognitive
model in mind.
States, dispositions, and lo gic
Even the most simple artifact can be thought as being in one of
several states: a door is open or closed, a cup is full or empty, an
engine is running or is off. Such near binary state systems can be
described by propositional logic whose expressions are either true
or false. The usefulness of such descriptions suggests that man
made forms have more to do with logic, language, and mind than
with physical continua, including geometry. After all, people
describe what they do in language, they communicate with others
about what they wish to accomplish, and it is therefore no surprise
that artifacts are designed according to an operational logic that
makes sense. People seek to understand the world in these logical
terms as well.
What makes artifacts complex is the multitude of states they
may assume at different times and the multivalued nature of the

20

logic needed to describe their operation. However, unlike
engineers who must be aware of all details of a complex system,
designers must realize that users bring simplified cognitive models
(homomorphisms) to bear on such systems and link experiences
from other semantic domains by metaphor to enrich the cognitive
models of what goes on within them. Naturally, in such simplified
user models, anthropomorphisms often reign supreme. Thus,
programming becomes a kind of teaching and states are seen as
dispositions, that is, as a readiness to act in a certain direction.
Behavior sequences are interpreted in terms of purposes, and
whole systems, as having a will of their own, including psycho
pathologies, being either user-friendly (cooperative) or hostile
(frustrating user expectations).
Indications of an object's states and logic need to afford users'
conceptions, however different these conceptions may be from
those of their inventors. In the extreme, the difference between
engineering and scientific models (forms) and user's models (for
constructing meanings) may be reflected in the difference between
how the inside and outside appear respectively. In practice,
different models may call for a layered semantics that enables users
to penetrate through the simplest and, literally, surface appearance
to deeper and deeper levels of understanding. The Xerox
photocopying machine designed at RichardsonSmith is a good
example. The surface can be handled with desk-top metaphors for
paperwork. Opening it allows users to see paperflows and enables
them to fix simple processing errors. Further penetration is
reserved for qualified repair persons and the final layer for
engineers.

18) John Rheinfrank and the Exploratory
Design Laboratory at Rich;i rdsonSmith,
Worth;ngton, Ohio, have used this
distinction repeatedly in work for various
clients. Also see J ohn Rhcinfrank, "A
Conceptual Framework for Designing
User Interaction into Products," Inno
vation 3, 2 (1984): 28-32.

19) Axiology is the scientific study of values

Motivations
The notion of a value system posits values as unalterably fixed
dispositions or as socially shared superindividual purposes, either
of which are assumed to provide invariant motivations of indivi
dual behavior. This view denies the variety of individual cognitive
constructions that users engage when interacting with their
environment. Such a position is untenable. Instead, I conceive
motivations as arising with the exploration of the opportunities
objects afford users in particular contexts. Rheinfrank, et al. 1 8
distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.
Extrinsic motivation derives from using something as a means to
an end. The desirability of this end then motivates the means' use.
Forms that promise the achievement of something desirable are
attractive for this very reason, whereas forms that do not express
such expectations cannot possibly provide a basis for instrumental
use. This simple fact establishes the dependency of extrinsic
motivation on recognizing instrumental opportunities in a form
and, thereby, the primacy of semantics over axiology. 1 9
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and aimS at a logic of objective value
judgments as if values had nothing to do
with the way people construct their
worlds or their artifacts and communi
cate with each other through them. I am
supposing here that individuals are more
autonomous in their world constructions
and preferences than an axiology might
grant.

Intrinsic motivation stems from using something for its own
sake, from interactive involvement regardless of possible gains.
Whereas extrinsic motivation is always explained by reference to
some product, result, or something outside of it, intrinsic
motivation is uniquely rooted in the process of interaction. It
stays within the confines of a circular cognitive process, for
example, within the rules of an engaging game, and suggests an
esthetics of process rather than of form.
Perhaps the crucial difference between extr'insic and intrinsic
motivation is that they refer to two different cognitive paradigms,
the instrumental and the symbolic. In the instrumental mode of
thinking everything is directed toward and justified in terms of a
goal - a problem to be solved, an obstacle to be removed, or
desirable conditions to be optimized - whereby the artifacts
affording such purposes have no value in themselves. In industrial
design, this motivation unquestionably underlies industrial
production, marketing, and advertising and is embedded in
traditional functionalism. In the symbolic mode of thinking,
everything seems directed to achieve balance: a sense of integrity,
coherence, harmony, or wholeness of divergent parts, a sense of
self-realization in interaction with others, a sense of oneness with
thl, environment. Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations are not
mutually exclusive, however. For example, a competitive game
may simultaneously motivate by the prospect of winning and by
being humanly engaging, regardless of outcome. Artifacts that
cannot provide either kind of motivation are not usable in any
sense and, hence, of little concern to product semantics.
Redundancies
Industrial production creates large numbers of identical forms
that must be usable by and understandable to many very different
users. One way of supporting this kind of production is to
promote a uniform understanding; another is to build redundancy
into the operational meanings of products. The former was the
aim of functionalism; the latter is more in line with product
semantics, and it recognizes that individuals differ markedly in
how they construct and approach their world. People have sensory
preferences: some are visually oriented, others tend to rely more
on tactile, acoustic, or verbal information. People bring amazingly
different cognitive models to a situation and develop different
interaction and learning styles. People have different cultural
histories that emphasize reliance on some clues over others or
favor different paths of exploration. Unless designed for very
homogeneous populations, industrial products must afford these
differences, allowing visual, tactile, acoustical, and verbal indica
tors or clues to different interpretations of forms to exist side by
side. This parallelism of expression may either be redundant,
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20) Gregory Bateson, Naven (Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 1958), and Gregory
Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
(New York: Ballentine, 1972),

consistently supporting the same operational meanings in diverse
populations of users and thereby increase motivation, or it may
lead to contradictions and paradoxes, cause confusion, a'nd,
thereby, decrease motivation by either removing the fun inherent
in smooth and competent interaction (which could provide
intrinsic motivation) or increasing the possibilities of errors
(which reduces extrinsic motivation). Esthetics has always been
associated with redundancy20 and the operational theory of
meaning extends this to all levels of users' involvement with
artifacts and, ultimately, with themselves.

Sociolinguistic Context ·
Solitary use of everyday things is rare. We worry about what to
wear to a party, consider the appropriateness of a gift, have
opinions about someone's taste, imitate our idols' patterns of
consumption, and talk about all of this to friends. These examples
involve bystanders, critics, judges, or interested parties to which
users relate. These need be neither real nor present, however.
When acquiring a product, for example, buyers usually think of
other individuals, both recognizable when seen and wholly
imaginary, who serve as references for their decisions and are
consulted in the buyer's mind. "What would my mother say about
my wearing this dress" is the kind of question to which an
approving answer may have to be found in order to feel
comfortable wearing it. Although such a discourse may take place
entirely inside a user's mind and between hypothetical people, it
matches in importance what people talk about in fact. Discussion
of everyday things takes place in language and subjects the things
talked about to social definitions and meanings. In this context,
objects participate in human communication and support linguist
ically mediated social practices.
In the absence of in-depth literature about this context, I will
elaborate four sociolinguistic uses of artifacts and comment
briefly on their implications for design:
■ expressions of user identities
■ signs of social differentiation and integration
■ content of communication
■ material support for social relationships
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This context could be viewed by means of the tri angle in figure 5
involving the self, others, and material artifacts among which a
variety of relationships and their dynamics are at issue.

21) Clare Cooper, "The House as Symbol of
Self," in N. �1. Prohans.ky, W, H.
lttelson, and L. G. Rivlin, eds. Envi�
ronmental Prjehology, People and their
Physical S,wings {New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1976): 435,48.

User identities
When it comes to showing who they are or want to be, people
seem to totally abandon utilitarian criteria or at best assign them a
subordinate role. This is obvious with jewelry and fashion, for
which technical considerations are minimal, indeed; however, even
in highly technical domains of decision making people often
abandon technical criteria as well. For example, driving below 55
miles per hour, a Porsche drives as well as a Honda Civic or a VW
Rabbit. Worse, a Porsche offers less space, incurs far higher
maintenance costs, and is more likely to be stolen, but it gives its
owner a special flair, a sporry, wealthy, "yuppie" identity few
other cars can provide. These attributes make the difference, not
the technical data published and discussed in the salesroom.
Designers are not free from identity considerations either.
Designers who are unaware of product semantics may profes
sionally advocate the most radical functional perspectives while
surrounding themselves with demonstrably beautiful things,
ordinary objects cast into elegant shapes, expensive designs by
famous firms or architects. This is exemplified by Gerrit Rietveld' s
chair, which neglects all comfort for its exquisite geometric style.
Indeed, people and even entire countries, are willing to carry
considerable burdens, inconveniences, and expenses just to be
special, which often means surrounding themselves with objects
aimed at defining their identity, for themselves to feel good about
and for others to recognize.
The criteria that govem choices of this kind show little
resemblance with those of problem solving or representational
uses. Means and ends are indistinguishable here, and objects and
what they mean become one, The criteria are based more on
gestalt considerations and are concerned chiefly with how users
weave their own identity into the symbolic fabric of society, The
way people relate to their homes may serve as an example here.
Based on Jungian notions, Cooper21 shows a home as the place
where individuals feel in the center of their own self-constructed
universe, at which point their identity becomes indistinguishable
with the things chosen to symbolize it. Users then are in a part
whole (metonymic) relationship with the complex of objects
surrounding them. (This relationship contrasts sharply with the
means-end relationships of operational use.)
Social differentiation and integration
People want to be different but never so different that they no
longer resemble others in some respect. A user's identity is but one
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22) Mihaly Csikszcntmihalyi and Eugene
Rocbberg-Halton, The Meaning of
Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981).

extreme by which the self is distinguished from all others. By the
above premise, individualization can never be total. The feeling of
belonging to or being part of larger social entities, classes,
professional groups, or religious denominations is, again, mediated
largely through the deliberate use of particular objects. With the
emphasis on similarities, Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton22
point out that such objects become symbols of integration. That
many established designers drive BMW s, that architects are
connoisseurs in fine restaurants, that "yuppies" live with chromed
steel furniture, and so forth are slightly exaggerated examples of
ways to express belongingness, shared attitudes, or common
privileges.
However, marking belongingness to one group entails excluding
belongingness to others. For objects to serve as symbols of
integration, they must also draw distinctions between those who
can afford, are able to, or are entitled to their use and those who
are not so privileged. Thus, they function as symbols of
differentiation as well. Things that are rare, expensive, or difficult
to have access to or use are particularly suited to play this dual
social role, and the extent to which industrial products must serve
this function limits their mass production. For this reason, one
cannot get everyone to wear the same clothes, live in identical
apartments, or drive the same kind of car.
The delicate dialectic between differentiation and integration
has often been overshadowed by status conceptions. Indeed, the
process of differentiation and integration is rarely neutral and
most cultures seem to rank people according to the power,
respect, envy, or privileges they command. Only the artifacts
chosen to support these inequalities vary. However, status is not a
linear scale. There are status conflicts, incompatibilities, and
shifts, and designers must recognize the social dynamics their
products may initiate; for example, when objects designed for use
in one group employ symbols of integration for another, or when
high-status symbols are made easily accessible to low-status
groups. Therefore, industrial interests to produce greater numbers
of identical products can easily conflict with social needs for
symbols of differentiation, integration, and status. Designers can
respond by providing ways of individualizing, customizing, or
altogether losing this social motivation for consumption or use.
Content of communication

Objects also provide important topics of conversations, and, by so
doing, acquire meanings that are in fundamental ways different
from operational use. Things are distinguished, named, and
classified through language. Thus, objects that are not clearly
distinguishable linguistically are also often confused in practice.
For example, the generalization of the word Jeep to all rugged-
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23) Charles E. Osgood, George J. Sud, anti
Percy H, Tannenbaum, The Measure
wnt ofMeaning (Urbana: University of
Iltinois Press, 1%7).
24) K. Anders Ericsson and Herbert A.

Slmon,Protocoi Analysis: Verbaf Rrpvrts
as Data (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1934},

25) For example, Richard Fisher and Gerda
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looking four-wheel-drive vehicles bothers American Motors, as
seen in its advertising. It is in language that things are joked about,
criticized, or praised. Products that can easily be made fun of
rarely succeed. There is a legend of examples where jokes and
funny names prevented products from widespread use. The
official name for Volkswagen's rugged utility and hunting vehicle,
Thing, for example, cannot easily be incorporated into linguistic
discourse. "I am driving a Thing" makes many people wonder
what is meant, whereas substituting the word jeep or Thunderbird
for it would not. The car never became popular, probably for
sociolinguistic rather than functional reasons. It is also in language
that objects are admitted into specific social practices. The
distinction among wine glasses, and between them and other types
of glasses, follows conventions negotiated in language and usage
(which glass for which occasion) and is socially evaluated and
judged.
Inasmuch as criteria for evaluating and judging objects are
formulated in language and negotiated in communication among
people, including users, forms may have to be designed in view of
the categories and distinctions drawn by the speakers of language.
Designers often seek to fuse two well-known technologies into a
new device that cannot be easily recognized and talked about for
its neither-quality. The language used by consumers often differs
from the language used by designers, who must fit their designs
into commonly available categories or cause enormous advertising
costs to gain acceptance. Linguistic categories are also subject to
their own dynamics. The transformation of portable radios into
tape-playing "ghetto blasters" (boxes) shows ho w social defini
tions change and how particular groups can appropriate objects as
symbols of their own.
Finally, language provides the research medium into users' ,
cognitive models, motivations, and meanings. Charles Osgood's
semantic differentia[,2l to use a well-known example, calls for
rating products by scales, whose end points are marked by polar
opposites, for example, fast/slow, expensive/cheap, active/passive,
attractive/repulsive, and, thus, involve objects in simple adjectival
constructions. Protocol analysis,24 on the other hand, maps how
users describe themselves as interacting with objects. Either result
is rooted in language and cannot be separated from respondents'
linguistic use of objects in communication with others. When a
truck cabin is said to be compact, sturdy, functional, comfortable,
and so forth, this description may say more about the linguistic
use of the words truck cabin than about truck cabins. Research
methods in product semantics that use verbal instructions,
stimuli, or responses are therefore also methods of establishing the
sociolinguistic meanings into which designers have to fit their
products. All efforts to establish· design languages" attempt to

Mikosch, Grundl,igen einer Theorie der
Produktsprache (Offenbach: Hochschule

fiir Gestaltung, 1984); Toenis Kaeo and
Julius Lengart, et al., Productgesta!t
(MUnchen: Siemens AG, undated).

make sense of objects by verbally putting them in the context of
conversations.

Social relationships
Objects also play an important role in establishing, maintaining,
or changing social relationships. This role is a necessary conse
quence of transferring the ownership of material entities among
people and of the meanings objects thereby acquire. After
repeatedly purchasing from the same merchant, a buyer may
become a favorite customer, which entails a special relationship of
trust that both buyer and seller recognize and seek to cultivate. In
other words, consumer products must not only look worth their
cost to the consumer at the point of sale, because this exchange is
based on and feeds relationships of trust, products may have to be
designed with this affordance in mind. Gifts, as another category
of exchange of goods, provide a more interpersonal example.
Although a gift is always thought to be of benefit to a receiver and
affordable by a donor, it necessarily introduces some asymmetry
into an existing social relationship. Receiving a gift not only
requires that the receiver express some gratitude to the donor, but
also imparts an unspoken obligation to reciprocate in the future.
Similarly, symbols such as wedding bands are not merely signs of
married persons but constant reminders of the special relationship
between two people and the church or state that invests its power
in protecting this relationship. (The word symbol comes from the
ancient Greek tradition of two parting friends breaking a coin into
two halves that each carries in the hope that this will bring them
together again.) Industrial products, bribes, loaned or borrowed
objects, gifts, and symbols are all involved in mediating social
relationships, which designers may accidentally ignore and disable
or deliberately honor and support.

Context of Genesis

26) Sagan and Margulis, Whole Earth Review
cited above.

Artifacts are not only instrumental to users (operational context)
and constitutive of social realities (sociolinguistic context), but
they are also created, produced, marketed, consumed, retired, or
recycled, and experiences with them inform a subsequent
generation of artifacts. This process forms a grand cycle,
oversimplifyingly called the production-consumption cycle, which
knits designers, engineers, producers, suppliers, distributors,
advertisers 1 salespersons, consumers, users, waste managers,
applied scientists, researchers, and regulatory agencies into an
ongoing process of technological autopoiesis. 26 These participants
have a stake in maintaining this process and can therefore be called
stakeholders. Simplified and with the designers' part too exag
gerated, this cycle is depicted in figure 6.
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27) John L. Austin, How to do Things with
Words (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1962),
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DISTRIBUTION

CONSUMPTION
Design students learn and practitioners frequently repeat the
misconception that industrial designers create industrial products
for mass consumption. This conception lacks awareness of the
differential roles other stakeholders play and unduly emphasizes
tangible products over the process of generating them. Designers
usually are involved with two kinds of activities, and successful
designers engage both well. First, designers create highly individ
ualized patterns in the form of drawings, sketches, models,
des�riptions of possible uses, specifications (of materials and
· production processes needed to enable others to realize their ideas
as rendered), corporate strategies, and advertising campaigns. The
materiality in which these patterns are embodied is irrelevant or
secondary to the information they carry and the sense they make
to others. Within the semiotic framework, designers create
representations or descriptions of things; but because these
creations are things themselves, I prefer to view them as
information or manifestations of patterns in transition.
Second, designers must convince others to get involved or their
creations (pattern) rarely bear fruit. In fact, most designers spend
the greater portion of their time developing presentations, selling
their ideas, and communicating with clients. Some designers claim
that 80 percent of their time is presentation, 10 percent is
administration, and 10 percent is searching for solutions. In
convincing others, designers do tailor their patterns, like messages,
to what clients want, are willing to accept, and are able to use
(produce and pass on). With speech-act theory, one could say that
designers are above all communicators and the patterns they
produce must have some perlocutionary force27 for other stake
holders to be attracted to and influenced by them.
Thus, in the context of genesis, artifacts can best be seen
informationally, as temporarily frozen manifestations of pattern.
The ideas in the designer's mind becomes frozen in the form of
drawings. Drawings are used by engineers to develop production
schedules. Production schedules enable marketers to settle on

distribution plans and advertising strategies. These attract
potential users to acquire or consume the products. Industrial
concerns usually stop here, but the process of transforming
patterns into different materialities continues. Research on the
patterns of interaction between products and users feeds back to
and informs designers and producers. Users apply industrial
products to their individual environments (an issue discussed in
the section on ecological context), and all artifacts are ultimately
retired, recycled, or decomposed and collectively influence the
physical environment in unintended and barely understood ways.
Problems recognized in the subsequent environment provide the
fertile ground motivating new ideas. New ideas are but combi
nations, reorganizations, or modifications of patterns already in
existence. Thus, the production of artifacts neither has a natural
target nor terminates with an end user: it" continuously feeds on

itself

28) Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
cited above,

In the context of genesis, artifacts - and natural objects could
be included here as well - are always in transition. They are the
products of one process and the inputs to others, semantically
carrying their own history into the future. They are like messages
in circuit, as Gregory Bateson" has taught, being continuously
created, articulated, interpreted, and translated into other
messages that collectively produce the very technology that
produced them. The stakeholders in this process are then best
described as communicators of organized matter that make a
difference in their lives.
The context of genesis affords several laws. Stated in factual
terms, the most important law reads as follows: The existence of

any artifact is living proof of the viability of all of its genetically
preceding manifestations. Obviously, an idea that is unthinkable

cannot be sketched. Something indescribable (something that
cannot be expressed in words, drawn on paper, or otherwise
communicated) to a producer cannot be built. A product that is
unknown to potential users cannot be sold. The law boldly
suggests that the chain of a pattern's transformation cannot be
broken. Nothing comes from nowhere. The nonviability of any
one manifestation in this chain can become the reason for a pattern
to become extinct.
Stated prescriptively, the law could read: Patterns should be

designed to survive all the successive transformation into manifes
tations (artifacts) that are necessary to ultimately support themselves.

Thus, in the context of genesis, the unit of design concerns is not a
consumer product but the circular process through which those
patterns may travel that enable a particular behavior to evolve. If
artifacts are to carry their own history into the future, they must
be equipped with the semantics to do so.
For designers to take responsibility for this circular process the
Design Issues: Vol. V, Number 2
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following requirements must be satisfied:

■ Addressing the network
■ Comprehensibility

■■
■
■

Resource availability
Costs and benefits
Adaptability
Entropy and pollution

Addressing the network
Ideas might not find their way through the complex network of a
production-consumption cycle by themselves, unless they bear
the addresses to the intended stakeholders. Indeed, many great
ideas have been wasted by falling into the wrong hands or arriving
at their destination at inappropriate times. In addition, and unlike
mail, which bears just one address, designers are not the only ones
who have clients. Clients have clients too. It follows that patterns
must be designed to travel by efficient paths through a whole
circular chain of stakeholders. Each manifestation must then
include the addresses to the remainder of the intended path. The
histories of artifacts may become lost but what gives them
direction should not.
Oµe mode of addressing used by designers employs symbolism,
which some receivers find attractive and seek out for themselves
when needed. Advertisers think that way, but only about buyers.
Another mode uses a language that only the intended stakeholders
know how to interpret. Drugs tend to be described in vocabulary
only qualified doctors understand for fear they might get into the
wrong hands. During the product development phase, successful
design firms often involve as many stakeholders as possible in a
process that includes reaching consensus on who does what, when,
and how. Advertisements are naturally placed in magazines that
reach desired consumers. The exclusion of children's access to
medicine bottles was already mentioned. Ecologists have convin
cingly argued - though not in these words - that addressing
should extend beyond marketing concerns to where retired
products can be recycled or may be disposed of without causing
environmental destruction.

Comprehensibility

Stakeholders cannot be expected to proceed with anything that
does not make sense to them. To render intelligible what might
otherwise appear nonsense is difficult. Even though designers
might complain about the gory taste of engineers or about the
culrurally irresponsible opportunism of sales personnel, rarely
does one group have what the other lacks. Difficulties in
communication are usually rooted in different professional
histories, experiences, conceptions, and interests. To overcome
30

these calls for agreement on a language capable of expressing
patterns in forms that afford the stakeholders different cognitive
models, refer to individually different experiences, and appeal to
different values.
Functionalism in engineering, ergonomics, and marketing
provided such a bridge in the past, but it did not embrace the social
and cultural domains. Product semantics is an example of a
developing framework by which designers can communicate about·
their previously inexpressible sensitivities, cultural responsibil
ities, and user concerns at the same time. It promises knowledge
about how people make sense of the'ir physical environment,
presents methodologies and replicable tests for the design of
human interfaces in a variety of contexts, and provides a platform
for consensus about the concepts used. This framework is
applicable not only to the stage of consumption, but to all
stakeholders involved in the flow of pattern.
There are no perfect tests for whether an artifact works other
than that its underlying pattern has succeeded in making sense to
the stakeholders throughout a complete production-consumption
cycle. Comprehensibility is a requirement for transmission of
pattern (information) and a significant bottleneck for genesis.

Resource availability
For a pattern to be realized or implemented requires that
stakeholders command adequate resources. There is no sense in
proposing technologies of unknown availability, products for
consumers who do not exist, or distribution mechanisms whose
costs are inestimable. Recognizing the availability of adequate
resources requires a level of understanding that goes one step
beyond comprehensibility by involving the physical processes that
designs or patterns need to inform.
For designers, this step implies explicitness as to how a pattern
may be implemented, acted upon, or used and which physical
conditions are required to succeed in this endeavor. Successful
design firms not only present their ideas, but also bring potential
producers, suppliers, banks, market researchers, user groups, and
so forth together, inform their clients where adequate resources
are available or how available resources may be utilized. In this
respect, designers resemble technology managers rather than
applied artists who produce their own works. In the absence of
such efforts, designers are likely to be conservative of familiar
practices, parochial in scope, or fail.

Costs and benefits
Within the production-consumption cycle, motivation tends to
be unevenly distributed. For consumers, the time between paying
for a product and experiencing the benefits of its use is short and
Design Issues: Vol. V, Number 2
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the margin of profit (benefits minus costs) tends to be small.
Marketing and advertising seek to ensure that a product's form
prominently expresses its benefits. In comparison, yields from
investments in research and product development are large but
typically arrive with considerable delay. It follows that producers
have greater investments in the circular process than consumers,
leaving little for recyclers and waste managers.
Whereas consumer benefits of a product can be expressed in
that product's form, a major design problem in the context of
genesis is to sustain the producer's expectations of benefits to the
point of actual yield. Research and product development
commitments usually follow from high expectations of benefits
derived from convincing presentations by designers, supportive
profitability analyses, and market research results. However, the
initial enthusiasm erodes as development and production costs
accumulate, unless this enthusiasm is continuously fed or
nourished. It requires designers either to be part of the process or
to communicate with their designs something that sustains this
motivation at least to the point of actual yields.

Adaptability
Traditional machines, such as scissors, steam engines, bridges, and
automobiles, serve just a few anticipated functions, forcing users
to adapt. Designs for these products are equally fixed. This
situation is changing through the invention of adaptive systems
and user-programmable computers and the extension of design
activities into social systems. The creation of production
consumption cycles represents the most sophisticated example.
Such systems can have a life of their own, adapting to their own
environments, learning from users, changing their behavior,
growing and developing into product niches, and protecting
themselves from misuse. They can also generate additional
artifacts and be self-maintaining.
Since the advent of cybernetics, intelligent systems are no
longer unusual. Human interfaces with such systems call for a
product semantics quite different from simple and relatively fixed
form-meaning relationships of traditional design applications.
Intelligent systems are similar to behavioral chameleons, and their
appearance should explain whether (and how) they grow like
crystals or computer networks, learn like mice in a maze or
generate novel responses from given rules.
Three directions for such a semantics are currently explored.
One is the design of computer interfaces by means of screens and
controls expressing the opportunities and tools necessary to make
them do whatever users desire, their range of affordances being
virtually inexhaustible. A second is the design of components that
enable users to assemble a nearly unimaginably large variety of
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applications, each corresponding to individualized needs. A third
is the design of corporate strategies that are generative of a
coherent line of products which are responsive to changing
situations, new technological developments, and different user
demands. These directions conceive patterns as language-like
facilities - user-adapted programming concepts, combinatorial
grammars, and generative design languages - whose particular
"expressions" are always merely one of many and within that
language possible forms whose particular realization escapes its
designers' exclusive control.

Entropy and pollution
In the context of genesis, the communication of symbols,
messages, and artifacts and the transformation of patterns they
inform drive the flow of energy and matter in a production
consumption cycle. Two laws, simplified but of considerable
generality, are relevant here:
energy used = work + reusable energy + entropy

raw material = organized matter + recyclable waste + pollution

The first equation restates the first two basic laws of
thermodynamics. The second is the material analog of thermo
dynamics in which pollution is a dispersion of matter that is
impossible or too costly to reverse and that represents maximally
disorganized matter. Figure 7 depicts the application of these
distinctions to any one stakeholder's work. What is true for
individuals or groups also applies to whole systems. All production
of organized matter or artifacts requires work but irreversibly
increases entropy and pollution. Only the rate at which these
measures of decay increase differ from product to product.
Globally, entropy makes available levels of energy increasingly
useless, and pollution makes available raw material increasingly
costly. According to these laws, the p hysical production of things
makes that production increasingly impossible.
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Designers should be especially aware of and responsible for the
global effects of their creative efforts. From the point of view of a
responsible product semantics, inventing and pursuing symbolic
strategies that slow down the inevitable processes of decay are
important. This may be accomplished by designing industrial
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products that can be produced in an energy-efficient manner, can
adapt to users' sense-making needs, can direct their own recycling,
and can protect other species of artifacts from needless decay, This
is the most general recommendation of a product semantics in the
context of genesis.

The Ecological Context

29) Jacob von Uexkiill, "Band X, Abhand
lungen zur theoretischen Biologie und
ihrer Geschichte, sowie zur Philosophie
der Organischen Naturwissenschaften,''
in Bedeutungslehre (Leipzig: Johann
Ambrosius Barth, 1940). UexkUII devel
ops a general theory of species-specific
construction of meanings and environ
ments that can provide a conceptual
framework for accounting for the inter
action among species in an ecology. It is
consistent with my approach to seman
tics. In the absence of a translation, his
Theoretical Biology (London: Paul,
Trench & Trubner, 1926) contains the
rudiments of his approach.

30) Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
cited above.
31) Kenneth Boulding, Ecodynamics (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1978).
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Ecological concerns are usually articulated in terms of preserving
the natural environment of some time ago. Although these
concerns have some merit, they must include the artifacts people
live with as well. Hence, I take ecology as a framework for
exploring how the interaction among different kinds of artifacts
make sense.
The idea of ecology comes from biology, where it is defined as
the interaction of p op ulations of species and is applied largely to
plants and animals. It is attractive as a model for four reasons:
First, each population of species is regarded as living in its own
environment to which it responds and by which it organizes itself
into its very own categories (Uexkiill's Merkwelt). The environ
ment that a population affects (Uexkull's Wirkwelt) may only
partly overlap with the former but may be "seen" or responded to
by �ome other population (at least of human observers)."
Second, populations of species are thought to interact through
such partially overlapping environments, without presumption
that one "understands" the nature of the other, and the larger
ecology is described as a network of such interactions. There is
also no assumption of wholeness, no hierarchy, no master plan, no
overriding purpose, and no central authority, even though some
species are clearly more dominant than others. So conceived, an
ecology is a distributed, heterarchical, and dynamic system.
Third, relationships between populations of species, whether
they are cooperative, competitive, symbiotic, or parasitic, emerge
in interaction or are "negotiated," so to speak, without some
outsider unilaterally imposing them, There is no central ruler,
only participants who may assert their will in their own
environment of others. An ecology is not democratic, egalitarian,
or just, but is responsive to every population.
Fourth, ecological systems seek balances or converge toward
some equilibrium, at which point populations keep each other in
check, maintain varieties of species, and ensure efficient use of
limited resources. Gregory Bateson, 30 among others, described
such an equilibrating tendency as distributed wisdom,
As Kenneth Boulding3 1 points out, there are many species of
artifacts, perhaps even more than biological species now existing.
Items described in an unabridged Sears catalog are probably more
numerous than biological species listed in a high school text on
biology, and this catalog is far from being representative of the

products available worldwide. Species of artifacts also cover
greater ranges than biological species do. They range wider in size:
skyscrapers are larger than elephants, artificial molecules are
smaller than amoebas. They range wider in complexity: computer
chips have more memory than lower animals, not to speak of stock
markets that even humans cannot comprehend, and they can
function much longer than any living organism, as museums can
testify. Human beings can be considered artifacts to the extent
they are social beings, speak a common language, assume social
roles, conform to behavioral conventions, and are, in these
respects, replaceable. Organizations are artifacts as well, created
by humans, interacting with one another in particular environ
ments containing various resources, markets, stakeholders, and
regulatory agencies. The implications for product semantics of
placing artifacts in ecological contexts are enormous and call for a
whole book. However, only three aspects of particular interest to
design are discussed here: competition, cultural complexes, and

autopoiesis.

Competition
In linguistics, in discourse analysis, in particular, differences in
meanings of words are recognized by differences in the linguistic
environments in which they can or do occur. Accordingly, words
are synonymous if they are freely substituted for each other in the
same text. So, the word early, as in the phrase "he came early," is
usually substituted with too soon, making them synonymous,
whereas prematurely can only occasionally substitute for early, the
difference in context being the formality or informality of speech.
The very same way of thinking about meaning applies to artifacts
that might also be substituted for each other and, thereby,
compete with each other for available positions. Cars substituted
for horse-drawn carriages and depleted their numbers. Electronic
messages and telefaxes are largely substitutes for written letters,
save for the electronic environment needed, and are likely to
reduce the use of postal services. Substitution is rarely perfect,
however. Just as horses have found a niche in sports and pleasure
that cars cannot easily penetrate, so has the telephone reduced
letter writing but may not drive it to extinction.
Cars do not look like horses, but early cars very much resembled
horse-drawn carriages, probably facilitating substitution, just as
personal computers now look very much like typewriters and
television sets, which they challenge. The form of these products
is what directs whether they fit into contexts in which they
compete with existing products and succeed or disappear as a
consequence of the interaction they support. Designers must
understand the dynamics of meaning that ecological interaction
entails; they must create forms that survive such interaction, that
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are sufficiently similar to competing forms, and that are sufficiently
distinct to make a difference.

Cultural complexes
Competing artifacts interact so that an increase in the numbers of
one decreases the numbers of the other. In contrast, cooperating
artifacts develop a variety of dependencies that support their
respective population sizes. There are dominance relationships in
which one population enables the other to increase in size, but the
latter's decline will influence the former only minimally. Batteries
dominate flashlights, but there are so many other uses for batteries
that a decline in the flashlight population does not significantly
influence the battery population. There are supportive- depend
ency relationships in which one population of artifacts, sometimes
called secondary gadgets, support but are existentially dependent
on the use of primary artifacts. Software is related to computers in
this manner. Software has enhanced computer use tremendously,
but computers existed before software was marketed on a large
scale. Among the various dependencies that emerge are those
governed by taste, style, and family belongingness. While chairs
always cooperate with tables as lightbulbs do with books, beyond
thes� family resemblances, items of similar style are attracted to
each other forming mutually supportive wholes. However, there
may also be parasitism and predation in which competition and
cooperation is not mutual, just as in a biological ecology.
The point of this argument is that dependencies that develop
among interacting populations of artifacts grow into cultural
complexes, which consist of many different artifacts whose
cooperative forms of interaction have become so stable that they
could be considered composite forms or systems in their own
right. The car complex is such an example. It consists of drivers,
car dealers, automobile manufacturers, streets, municipal trans
portation departments, gasoline stations, oil producers, all of
which cooperate with each other in keeping cars running and
themselves in place. (I am ignoring here competition within any
one category which does not change the system.) This complex
has threatened public transportation, such as trains, buses, and the
railroad; invaded the postal service; and put its stamp on the
architecture of cities, all of which are cultural complexes of their
own.
Newly designed artifacts rarely simply replace old designs. They
seek and encourage the emergence of somewhat different
environments, initiate shifts within their cultural complexes,
cause chain reactions throughout the larger ecology, and, there
fore, need to withstand the self-protective responses by those
affected. The omission of chrome on American cars made whole
factories obsolete. The initial success of cars with the new
36

aerodynamic look forced many other manufacturers to rethink
and find new· forms. In an ecology with artifacts, the meanings of
objects are always interacting and in flux. Changing one form may
have enormous consequences for others.

32) Sagan and Margulis, Whole Earth Review
cited above.

33) For the distinction between cognized
and operational models of reality, see
Roy A. Rappaport, "Sanctity and Adap
tation," The CoEvolution Quarterly
(1974): 54-8, and his Pigs for the Ances
tors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New
Guinea People (New Haven: Yale Univer
sity Press, t978).
34) This is also stressed in UexkUll's work,
Bedeutungslehre cited above.

Autopoiesis and conclusion
Ecologies with artifacts, including the cultural complexes outlined
above, do not work without human participation. People design
things, people direct production, and people put artifacts in their
places. Without the collective use of symbolic strategies for local
assembly and guidance, technology cannot behave as a self
productive or autopoietic system and would therefore decay. 3 2
True; designers can work within the functional tradition, with its
linear logic of achieving terminal ends and a semantics of " stand
for" if not "make-believe" relations to reality. Its exclusive
emphasis on allopoiesis - the production of something other
than itself - makes a functional perspective inherently limiting,
unable to conceptualize meanings that develop from circular
interactions within an ecology of artifacts and unable to participate
in creating symbolic strategies that make autopoiesis happen.
I have argued that, in the operational context, cognitive models
held by human individuals locally guide the assembly of artifacts
into individually meaningful wholes and that this takes place in
each individual's environment as cognized.33 This applies to
individual users of artifacts as well as to designers. The context of
genesis provides designers with cognitive models to create things.
Both models realize that formfollows meaning, which is shorthand
for saying symbolic strategies, not physics, govern the collective
use and assembly of artifacts into cultural systems. 34
Mythology probably is the most important and unconsciously
embracing governing structure in an ecology of artifacts. A culture
can hardly be conceived without myths, and its vitality derives
directly from them. In some cultures, mythology is codified in
ritual performances and stories of supernatural beings and gods.
These gods perform deeds of immense power and interact with
each other and humans through artifacts. In other cultures,
notably in the industrialized West, mythology has become more
hidden, unconscious, and implicit in superstitious beliefs and
repetitive cultural practices, but it occasionally surfaces through
powerful tragedies, movies, literature, and science fiction, as well
as major inventions that guide and occupy generations of people,
designers, producers, and users alike, Mythologies give coherence
to cultural complexes beyond individual understanding by
legitimizing its components, assigning them to perform meaningful
roles and directing them to interact with each other. Design
strategies that go against mythology go against the ancient
ecological wisdom that has been cumulatively acquired during

Design Issues: Vol. V, Number 2 Spring 1989

37

35) See S. Balaram's analysis of Mahatma
Gandhi's use of artifacts in this issue,
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centuries of human social experiences; these design strategies are
likely to fail in the ecological interactions they have to withstand.
Although largely unconscious, artifacts always mediate symbol
ically between the deep-rooted mythologies distributed in a
culture and the material contexts of everyday life. 35 With the
support of powerful mythologies, artifacts can gain considerable
ecological strength; denying this connection, whether by ignorance
or by preference for a functionalism that cannot cope with
meanings, produces an inhumane technology.
I have argued that, in the ecological context, cognitive spaces of
different participants need not be the same for interaction to take
place. Indeed, designers and consumers cannot be presumed to see
the world with the same eyes much less so do computers, streets,
forests, and grass. In any ecology, none of its participants properly including animals and plants - can possibly understand
the whole system of which they are part. Every participant is
limited by his, her, or its own cognitive models and by their largely
unconscious access to prevailing mythologies. Understanding an
ecology is therefore necessarily partial. Superindividual wholes
always are mythological indeed. Mythology in language bridges
different cognitive spaces and serves as a medium for negotiating
distinctions , differences, and typicalities and for coordinating the
use of individual symbolic strategies. Designers are but one kind of
participant in the ecological process, and the patterns they set in
motion could travel over such bridges but never without involving
the larger system of which they are a part. The designers of
symbolic strategies for artifacts may claim to reign supreme in this
ecology, but they cannot escape the hidden governance of
collectively shared archetypes and mythologies whose meanings
must be respected, grasped, tapped, and drifted with.
None of the four contexts of artifacts or the four constructions
for the theory and practice of product semantics exists entirely
outside someone's mind. They are suggested here as four principle
types of cognitive models for designers to create forms that make
sense for others. Thus conceived, product semantics is a radical
proposal for an ecology ofdesigners' minds. Its concepts of meaning
enable designers to communicate through the designed world with
other fellow human beings and to participate responsibly in an
ecology that is, at least in part, their own creation. The properly
self-referential nature of this kind of product semantics correlates
with the cultural autopoiesis it viably informs (figure 8).
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